Handbook of Applied Cryptography  chap11
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Mô tả: This is a Chapter from the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, by A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone, CRC Press, 1996. For further information, see www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac CRC Press has granted the following speciﬁc permissions for the electronic version of this book: Permission is granted to retrieve, print and store a single copy of this chapter for personal use. This permission does not extend to binding multiple chapters of the book, photocopying or producing copies for other than personal use of the person creating the copy, or making electronic copies available for retrieval by others without prior permission in writing from CRC Press. Except where overridden by the speciﬁc permission above, the standard copyright notice from CRC Press applies to this electronic version: Neither this book nor any part may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, microﬁlming, and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The consent of CRC Press does not extend to copying for general distribution, for promotion, for creating new works, or for resale. Speciﬁc permission must be obtained in writing from CRC Press for such copying. c 1997 by CRC Press, Inc. Chapter 11 Digital Signatures Contents in Brief 11.1 Introduction .425 11.2 A framework for digital signature mechanisms 426 11.3 RSA and related signature schemes .433 11.4 FiatShamir signature schemes .447 11.5 The DSA and related signature schemes 451 11.6 Onetime digital signatures .462 11.7 Other signature schemes 471 11.8 Signatures with additional functionality 474 11.9 Notes and further references 481 11.1 Introduction This chapter considerstechniques designed to provide the digital counterpartto a handwrit tensignature. A digitalsignatureof a messageis a numberdependenton somesecretknown only to the signer, and, additionally, on the content of the message being signed. Signatures must be veriﬁable; if a disputearises as to whether a party signed a document(caused by ei ther a lying signer trying to repudiate a signature it did create, or a fraudulent claimant), an unbiased third party should be able to resolve the matter equitably,without requiring access to the signer’s secret information (private key). Digital signatures have many applications in information security, including authenti cation, data integrity, and nonrepudiation. One of the most signiﬁcant applications of dig ital signatures is the certiﬁcation of public keys in large networks. Certiﬁcation is a means for a trusted third party (TTP) to bind the identity of a user to a public key, so that at some later time, other entities can authenticate a public key without assistance from a trusted third party. The concept and utility of a digital signature was recognized several years before any practical realization was available. The ﬁrst method discovered was the RSA signature sch eme, which remains today one of the most practical and versatile techniques available. Sub sequent research has resulted in many alternative digital signature techniques. Some offer signiﬁcant advantages in terms of functionality and implementation. This chapter is an ac count of many of the results obtained to date, with emphasis placed on those developments which are practical. 425 426 Ch. 11 Digital Signatures Chapter outline §11.2providesterminologyused throughoutthe chapter, and describesa framework for dig ital signatures that permits a useful classiﬁcation of the various schemes. It is more abstract than succeeding sections. §11.3 provides an indepth discussion of the RSA signature sch eme, as well as closely related techniques. Standards which have been adopted to imple ment RSA and related signature schemes are also considered here. §11.4 looks at meth ods which arise from identiﬁcation protocols described in Chapter 10. Techniques based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem, such as the Digital Signature Algo rithm (DSA) and ElGamal schemes, are the topic of §11.5. Onetime signature schemes, many of which arise from symmetrickey cryptography, are considered in §11.6. §11.7 de scribes arbitrated digital signatures and the ESIGN signature scheme. Variations on the ba sic concept of digital signatures, including blind, undeniable, and failstop signatures, are discussed in §11.8. Further notes, including subtle points on schemes documented in the chapter and variants (e.g., designated conﬁrmer signatures, convertible undeniable signa tures, group signatures, and electronic cash) may be found in §11.9. 11.2 A framework for digital signature mechanisms §1.6 provides a brief introduction to the basic ideas behind digital signatures, and §1.8.3 shows how these signatures can be realized through reversible publickey encryption tech niques. This section describes two general models for digital signature schemes. A com plete understanding of the material in this section is not necessary in order to follow sub sequent sections; the reader unfamiliar with some of the more concrete methods such as RSA (§11.3) and ElGamal (§11.5) is well advised not to spend an undue amount of time. The idea of a redundancy function is necessary in order to understand the algorithms which give digital signatures with message recovery. The notation provided in Table 11.1 will be used throughout the chapter. 11.2.1 Basic deﬁnitions 1. A digital signature is a data string which associates a message (in digital form) with some originating entity. 2. A digital signature generation algorithm (or signature generation algorithm)isa method for producing a digital signature. 3. A digital signature veriﬁcation algorithm (or veriﬁcation algorithm) is a method for verifying that a digital signature is authentic (i.e., was indeed created by the speciﬁed entity). 4. A digital signature scheme (or mechanism) consists of a signature generation algo rithm and an associated veriﬁcation algorithm. 5. A digital signature signing process (or procedure) consists of a (mathematical) digi tal signature generation algorithm, along with a method for formatting data into mes sages which can be signed. 6. A digital signature veriﬁcationprocess (or procedure) consists of a veriﬁcation algo rithm, along with a method for recovering data from the message. 1 1 Often little distinction is made between the terms scheme and process, and they are used interchangeably. c 1997 by CRC Press, Inc. — See accompanying notice at front of chapter. § 11.2 A framework for digital signature mechanisms 427 This chapter is, for the most part, concerned simply with digital signature schemes. In order to use a digital signature scheme in practice, it is necessary to have a digital signature process. Several processes related to various schemes have emerged as commercially rele vant standards; two such processes, namely ISO/IEC 9796 and PKCS #1, are described in §11.3.5and§11.3.6, respectively. Notation used in the remainder of this chapteris provided in Table 11.1. The sets and functions listed in Table 11.1 are all publicly known. Notation Meaning M a set of elements called the message space. M S a set of elements called the signing space. S a set of elements called the signature space. R a 1 − 1 mapping from M to M S called the redundancy function. M R the image of R (i.e., M R =Im(R)). R −1 theinverseofR (i.e., R −1 : M R −→ M). R a set of elements called the indexing set for signing. h a oneway function with domain M. M h the image of h (i.e., h: M−→M h ); M h ⊆M S called the hash value space. Table 11.1: Notation for digital signature mechanisms. 11.1 Note (comments on Table 11.1) (i) (messages) M is the set of elements to which a signer can afﬁx a digital signature. (ii) (signing space) M S is the set of elements to which the signature transformations (to be described in §11.2.2 and §11.2.3) are applied. The signature transformations are not applied directly to the set M. (iii) (signature space) S is the set of elements associated to messages in M. These ele ments are used to bind the signer to the message. (iv) (indexing set) R is used to identify speciﬁc signing transformations. A classiﬁcation of digital signature schemes §11.2.2 and §11.2.3 describe two general classes of digital signature schemes, which can be brieﬂy summarized as follows: 1. Digital signature schemes with appendix require the original message as input to the veriﬁcation algorithm. (See Deﬁnition 11.3.) 2. Digital signature schemes with message recovery do not require the original message as input to the veriﬁcation algorithm. In this case, the original message is recovered from the signature itself. (See Deﬁnition 11.7.) These classes can be further subdivided according to whether or not R =1, as noted in Deﬁnition 11.2. 11.2 Deﬁnition A digital signature scheme (with either message recovery or appendix) is said to be a randomized digital signature scheme if R > 1; otherwise, the digital signature scheme is said to be deterministic. Figure 11.1 illustrates this classiﬁcation. Deterministic digital signature mechanisms can be further subdivided into onetime signature schemes (§11.6) and multipleuse schemes. Handbook of Applied Cryptography by A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone. 428 Ch. 11 Digital Signatures Digital signature schemes message recovery appendix Randomized Deterministic Randomized Deterministic Figure 11.1: A taxonomy of digital signature schemes. 11.2.2 Digital signature schemes with appendix Digital signature schemes with appendix, as discussed in this section, are the most com monly used in practice. They rely on cryptographic hash functions rather than customized redundancy functions, and are less prone to existential forgery attacks (§11.2.4). 11.3 Deﬁnition Digital signature schemes which require the message as input to the veriﬁca tion algorithm are called digital signature schemes with appendix. Examples of mechanisms providing digital signatures with appendix are the DSA (§11.5.1), ElGamal (§11.5.2), and Schnorr (§11.5.3) signature schemes. Notation for the following discussion is given in Table 11.1. 11.4 Algorithm Key generation for digital signature schemes with appendix SUMMARY: each entity creates a private key for signing messages, and a corresponding public key to be used by other entities for verifying signatures. 1. Each entity A should select a private key which deﬁnes a set S A = {S A,k : k ∈R} of transformations. Each S A,k is a 11 mapping fromM h toS and is called a signing transformation. 2. S A deﬁnes a corresponding mapping V A from M h ×Sto {true, false} such that V A (m, s ∗ )= true, if S A,k (m)=s ∗ , false, otherwise, for all m ∈M h , s ∗ ∈S; here, m = h(m) for m ∈M. V A is called a veriﬁcation transformation and is constructed such that it may be computed without knowledge of the signer’s private key. 3. A’s public key is V A ; A’s private key is the set S A . c 1997 by CRC Press, Inc. — See accompanying notice at front of chapter. § 11.2 A framework for digital signature mechanisms 429 11.5 Algorithm Signaturegeneration and veriﬁcation (digital signature schemes with appendix) SUMMARY: entity A produces a signature s ∈Sfor a message m ∈M, which can later be veriﬁed by any entity B. 1. Signature generation. Entity A should do the following: (a) Select an element k ∈R. (b) Compute m = h(m) and s ∗ = S A,k (m). (c) A’s signature for m is s ∗ .Bothm and s ∗ are made available to entities which may wish to verify the signature. 2. Veriﬁcation. Entity B should do the following: (a) Obtain A’s authentic public key V A . (b) Compute m = h(m) and u = V A (m, s ∗ ). (c) Accept the signature if and only if u = true. Figure 11.2 provides a schematic overviewof a digital signature scheme with appendix. The following properties are required of the signing and veriﬁcation transformations: (i) for each k ∈R, S A,k should be efﬁcient to compute; (ii) V A should be efﬁcient to compute; and (iii) it should be computationally infeasible for an entity other than A to ﬁnd an m ∈M and an s ∗ ∈Ssuch that V A (m, s ∗ )=true, where m = h(m). V A true false M h ×S m m hS A,k MM h S s ∗ = S A,k (m) (a) The signing process (b) The veriﬁcation process Figure 11.2: Overview of a digital signature scheme with appendix. 11.6 Note (use of hash functions) Most digital signature schemes with message recovery (§11.2.3) are applied to messages of a ﬁxed length, while digital signatures with appendix are applied to messages of arbitrary length. The oneway function h in Algorithm 11.5 is Handbook of Applied Cryptography by A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone. 430 Ch. 11 Digital Signatures typically selected to be a collisionfree hash function (see Deﬁnition 9.3). An alternative to hashing is to break the message into blocks of a ﬁxed length which can be individually signed using a signature scheme with message recovery. Since signature generation is rel atively slow for many schemes, and since reordering of multiple signed blocks presents a security risk, the preferred method is to hash. 11.2.3 Digital signature schemes with message recovery The digital signature schemes described in this section have the feature that the message signed can be recovered from the signature itself. In practice, this feature is of use for short messages (see §11.3.3(viii)). 11.7 Deﬁnition A digitalsignature scheme withmessagerecoveryis a digital signature scheme for which a priori knowledge of the message is not required for the veriﬁcation algorithm. Examples of mechanisms providing digital signatures with message recovery are RSA (§11.3.1), Rabin (§11.3.4), and NybergRueppel (§11.5.4) publickey signature schemes. 11.8 Algorithm Key generation for digital signature schemes with message recovery SUMMARY: each entity creates a private key to be used for signing messages, and a cor responding public key to be used by other entities for verifying signatures. 1. Each entity A should select a set S A = {S A,k : k ∈R}of transformations. Each S A,k is a 11 mapping from M S to S and is called a signing transformation. 2. S A deﬁnes a correspondingmapping V A with the property that V A ◦S A,k is the iden tity map on M S for all k ∈R. V A is called a veriﬁcation transformation and is constructed such that it may be computed without knowledge of the signer’s private key. 3. A’s public key is V A ; A’s private key is the set S A . 11.9 Algorithm Signature generation and veriﬁcation for schemes with message recovery SUMMARY: entity A produces a signature s ∈Sfor a message m ∈M, which can later be veriﬁed by any entity B. The message m is recovered from s. 1. Signature generation. Entity A should do the following: (a) Select an element k ∈R. (b) Compute m = R(m) and s ∗ = S A,k (m).(R is a redundancy function; see Table 11.1 and Note 11.10.) (c) A’s signature is s ∗ ; this is made available to entities which may wish to verify the signature and recover m from it. 2. Veriﬁcation. Entity B should do the following: (a) Obtain A’s authentic public key V A . (b) Compute m = V A (s ∗ ). (c) Verify that m ∈M R . (If m ∈ M R , then reject the signature.) (d) Recover m from m by computing R −1 (m). c 1997 by CRC Press, Inc. — See accompanying notice at front of chapter. § 11.2 A framework for digital signature mechanisms 431 R M m M R M S S A,k m s ∗ = S A,k (m) S Figure 11.3: Overview of a digital signature scheme with message recovery. Figure 11.3 provides a schematic overview of a digital signature scheme with message recovery. The following properties are required of the signing and veriﬁcation transforma tions: (i) for each k ∈R, S A,k should be efﬁcient to compute; (ii) V A should be efﬁcient to compute; and (iii) it should be computationally infeasible for an entity other than A to ﬁnd any s ∗ ∈S such that V A (s ∗ ) ∈M R . 11.10 Note (redundancy function) The redundancy function R and its inverse R −1 are publicly known. Selecting an appropriate R is critical to the security of the system. To illustrate this point, suppose that M R = M S . Suppose R and S A,k are bijections from M to M R andM S to S, respectively. This implies that M and S have the same number of elements. Then for any s ∗ ∈S,V A (s ∗ ) ∈M R , and it is trivial to ﬁnd messages m and corresponding signatures s ∗ whichwill be accepted by the veriﬁcation algorithm (step 2 ofAlgorithm 11.9) as follows. 1. Select random k ∈Rand random s ∗ ∈S. 2. Compute m = V A (s ∗ ). 3. Compute m = R −1 (m). The element s ∗ is a valid signature for the message m and was created without knowledge of the set of signing transformationsS A . 11.11 Example (redundancy function) Suppose M = {m: m ∈{0, 1} n } for some ﬁxed posi tive integer n and M S = {t : t ∈{0, 1} 2n }.DeﬁneR: M−→M S by R(m)=mm, where denotes concatenation; that is, M R = {mm: m ∈M}⊆M S . For large val ues of n, the quantity M R /M S  =( 1 2 ) n is a negligibly small fraction. This redundancy function is suitable provided that no judicious choice of s ∗ on the part of an adversary will have a nonnegligible probability of yielding V A (s ∗ ) ∈M R . 11.12 Remark (selectinga redundancyfunction)Even thoughtheredundancyfunctionR is pub lic knowledge and R −1 is easy to compute, selection of R is critical and should not be made independently of the choice of the signing transformations in S A . Example 11.21 provides a speciﬁc example of a redundancy function which compromises the security of the signa ture scheme. An example of a redundancy function which has been accepted as an inter national standard is given in §11.3.5. This redundancy function is not appropriate for all digital signature schemes with message recovery, but does apply to the RSA (§11.3.1) and Rabin (§11.3.4) digital signature schemes. Handbook of Applied Cryptography by A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone. 432 Ch. 11 Digital Signatures 11.13 Remark (a particular class of message recovery schemes)§1.8.3 describes a class of dig ital signature schemes with message recovery which arise from reversible publickey en cryption methods. Examples include the RSA (§8.2) and Rabin (§8.3) encryption schemes. Thecorrespondingsignaturemechanismsare discussed in§11.3.1 and§11.3.4,respectively. 11.14 Note (signatures with appendix from schemes providing message recovery) Any digital signature scheme with message recovery can be turned into a digital signature scheme with appendix by simply hashing the message and then signing the hash value. The message is now required as input to the veriﬁcation algorithm. A schematic for this situation can be derived from Figure 11.3 and is illustrated in Figure 11.4. The redundancy function R is no longer critical to the security of the signature scheme, and can be any 1 − 1 function from M h to M S . R M R M S S A,k m s ∗ = S A,k ( m) M h M m h h(m) S Figure 11.4: Signature scheme with appendix obtained from one providing message recovery. 11.2.4 Types of attacks on signature schemes The goal of an adversary is to forge signatures; that is, produce signatures which will be accepted as those of some other entity. The following provides a set of criteria for what it means to break a signature scheme. 1. total break. An adversary is either able to compute the private key information of the signer, or ﬁnds an efﬁcient signing algorithm functionally equivalent to the valid signing algorithm. (For example, see §11.3.2(i).) 2. selective forgery. An adversary is able to create a valid signature for a particular mes sage or class of messages chosen a priori. Creating the signature does not directly involve the legitimate signer. (See Example 11.21.) 3. existential forgery. An adversary is able to forge a signature for at least one mes sage. The adversary has little or no control over the message whose signature is ob tained, and the legitimate signer may be involved in the deception (for example, see Note 11.66(iii)). There are two basic attacks against publickey digital signature schemes. 1. keyonly attacks. In these attacks, an adversary knows only the signer’s public key. 2. message attacks. Here an adversary is able to examine signatures corresponding ei ther to known or chosen messages. Message attacks can be further subdivided into three classes: (a) knownmessageattack. Anadversaryhas signaturesfora set ofmessageswhich are known to the adversary but not chosen by him. c 1997 by CRC Press, Inc. — See accompanying notice at front of chapter. § 11.3 RSA and related signature schemes 433 (b) chosenmessage attack. An adversary obtains valid signatures from a chosen list of messages before attempting to break the signature scheme. This attack is nonadaptive in the sense that messages are chosen before any signatures are seen. Chosenmessage attacks against signature schemes are analogous to chosenciphertext attacks against publickey encryption schemes (see §1.13.1). (c) adaptivechosenmessageattack. An adversary is allowed to use the signer as an oracle; the adversary may request signatures of messages which depend on the signer’s public key and he may request signatures of messages which depend on previously obtained signatures or messages. 11.15 Note (adaptivechosenmessageattack) In principle, an adaptive chosenmessage attack is the most difﬁcult type ofattack to prevent. It is conceivablethatgivenenoughmessagesand correspondingsignatures,an adversary could deduce a pattern and then forge a signatureof its choice. While an adaptive chosenmessage attack may be infeasible to mount in prac tice, a welldesigned signature scheme should nonetheless be designed to protect against the possibility. 11.16 Note (security considerations) The level of security required in a digital signature scheme mayvaryaccordingtotheapplication. For example, in situationswherean adversaryis only capable of mounting a keyonly attack, it may sufﬁce to design the scheme to prevent the adversary from being successful at selective forgery. In situations where the adversary is capable of a message attack, it is likely necessary to guard against the possibility of exis tential forgery. 11.17 Note (hash functions and digital signature processes) When a hash function h is used in a digital signature scheme (as is often the case), h should be a ﬁxed part of the signature process so that an adversary is unable to take a valid signature, replace h with a weak hash function, and then mount a selective forgery attack. 11.3 RSA and related signature schemes This section describes the RSA signature scheme and other closely related methods. The security of the schemes presented here relies to a large degree on the intractability of the integer factorization problem (see§3.2). The schemes presented include both digital signa tures with message recovery and appendix (see Note 11.14). 11.3.1 The RSA signature scheme The message space and ciphertext space for the RSA publickey encryption scheme (§8.2) are both Z n = {0, 1, 2, . ,n− 1} where n = pq is the product of two randomly chosen distinct prime numbers. Since the encryption transformation is a bijection, digital signa turescan be created by reversingthe rolesof encryptionanddecryption. The RSA signature scheme is a deterministic digital signature scheme which provides message recovery (see Deﬁnition 11.7). The signing spaceM S and signature space S are both Z n (see Table 11.1 for notation). A redundancy function R : M−→Z n is chosen and is public knowledge. Handbook of Applied Cryptography by A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone. . including authenti cation, data integrity, and nonrepudiation. One of the most signiﬁcant applications of dig ital signatures is the certiﬁcation of public. Signature Algo rithm (DSA) and ElGamal schemes, are the topic of §11.5. Onetime signature schemes, many of which arise from symmetrickey cryptography,
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